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J.ural Relations. By Albert Kocourek. With an Introduction by John H.
Wigmore. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1927. pp. xxiii, 482.
What is it that this recognized scholar has created, that his publisher can
advertise: "The Most Unusual Law Book Ever Written?" In the author's
words, "it deals chiefly with the jurisprudence topic of 'Rights'." Again,
the author announces a discovery of the fundamental part which "Jural
Relation" has for legal phenomena. And this he tells us "is the connecting
link between law regarded as a body of legal rules and the social activities
upon which the law is to operate." From this point he tells his story.
I am sure that I have missed much of the artistry with which the story
is told. Probably I have been too much interested in the architecture and
functions of the creation. At least these are the bases on which I venture
to pass judgment on the book.
My interpretation of Professor Kocourek's book is that he offers a most
elaborate language technic for handling the problems which arise in the
administration of law. The elaborateness of the creation cannot be exag-
gerated. It purports to be a completed system with the ramifications of its
entire theology all worked out, and it can well be assumed that such is true.
Now the falsest hope of legal scholarship has been to devise just this sort
of instrumentality. Seemingly it has been assumed that ,ome device of
words can be perfected which will in large part displace the necessity of
intelligent judging. The capacity to pass an acceptable judgment has al-
most universally been subordinated to a method of statement. The attempt
has been made under all sorts of guises, and there is not much to indicate
that efforts in this direction will ever cease. In fact at this moment the
profession at large is engaged in a wholesale attempt to restate the rules
of the common law in black letter. But such attempt, grandiose as it may
be, is antiquated, crude and incomplete in method, in comparison with
the methodology of this author.
The major postulate of Professor Kocourek's creation is not very far
down the line of inquiry. You meet it in the opening paragraph of the
first chapter: "(1) A system of potential legal rules. First, there is a body
of legal rules existing only in the abstract-potentially-awaiting applica-
tion in concrete cases." Certainly this is not unfamiliar legal theology,
but even so, the more likely it is to prevent the student who has found such
theology empty from reading further. These rules plus the "situations of
fact," plus "jural relations" (p. 3) supply the foundation for the super-
structure which follows. The function of this machinery is to save the
clumsy and erratic process of dealing with these rules by hand, so to speak,
from which at present so many bad results follow. By way of illustration:
instead of a lawyer or judge taking out his pencil and paper and seeking
to solve a complex computation by way of addition, subtraction, multipli-
cation, division, algebraic equation, the logarithmic table, or other such
device, he is given a machine which has keys set to the mass of rules in
our system of law. All the operator has to do is to punch the appropriate
keys as directed, operate certain levers, and the correct result flashes out.
A perfected mechanism designed to save labor, eradicate errors and to give
a more perfect result! The human equation reduced to a minimuml Is
such an invention to be despised? Not at all. On the other hand it could
but represent the highest expression of science. The fear of a "mechanical
justice'! is puerile. The only fears of mechanical devices are: (1) that they
are not mechanically perfeci; (2) that the limitations of any mechanism
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should be forgotten. I have the same sort of reaction to the description of
the author's process that I have to an explanation of the intricacies of a
submarine, of a modern telephone exchange, or the processes of television.
I am bewildered, but withal I am willing to guess that it is the most perfect
machine of its sort yet exhibited. Hohfeld's machinery was never perfected,
and -while the author uses many of the ideas of Hohfeld, for which he gives
generous credit, he perfects a different machine-one more complex and one
doubtless more delicately poised. But the two are designed along the same
lines and for the same purposes. To the debates which followed between
the successors of Hohfeld and the author, he gives great credit for the
clarification of his own ideas. And it may be added parenthetically that
probably the greatest value of the Hothfeldian analysis lies in the very fact
that it has been kept relatively simple and adjustable.
The contributions in this direction are severely limited-more so than
it seems to me has yet been realized. The least of these limitations is the
difficulty involved in the change of a language technic in so large and active
a field of thought and practice as that of the law. To Professor Kocourel
his creation doubtless seems simple enough. But it does not seem so to
those who have not followed its development. There are few minds en-
gaged in the administration of the law capable of mastering it. If the
lawyer's justly warrantable instinct for rejecting this sort of device, even
before he knows what it is, could be overcome, there are few judges, prac-
tictioners and teachers -who would give the time to attempt a mastery.
Perhaps such is not necessary. Of the millions who successfully operate
automobiles, complex machinery though they are, few know anything about
their mechanism. They depend almost wholly upon the workmanship behind
the machine to keep it going. If the device under consideration can
be put to work successfully in only a few places, the slow process of evolu-
tion struggling against apparently insurmountable odds will find a place
for it in a remarkably short time. A generation or two of law school stu-
dents makes over the thinking of the profession throughout. The ultimate
device may not be that of Kocourek or of Hobfeld, but it will be one modified
to meet the requirements of the day. The difficulties of language will not
kill the idea if it be usable.
But there are severer limitations than those of language. The most
serious are these: (1) a perfected language technic implies crystallized
rules of law, even though the crystallization be only for the day, or the
instant; (2) assuming rules of law and language both adjusted on any
particular day, constant readjustment of each would be required. There
must be definiteness and certainty for any sort of logic, mechanical or other-
wise. If the rules of addition, multiplication, etc., were equivocal there
could be no adding machine, rapid calculator, tables or other such devices.
Professor Kocourek's creation requires unequivocal rules of law, at least
for the instant. And the despairing outlook for the success of the scheme is
that rules of law tend to become less and less dependable, and more and
more fluid as society becomes more complex and people more intelligent.
And what is more, the choice between competing rules gives room for
countless errors. In the cases with which we disagree, ordinarily we find
that our disagreement is at bottom not with the application, but with the
choice of the rule. Rules, after all, are nothing more than the crystallized
judgments of society in the simpler cases. Here they are most usually clear.
But it is not the simple eases which demand machinery, much less the
elaborate machinery here suggested. It is the very Cases where the judge's
judgment as to the rules themselves is most in doubt which call for assist-
ance and which cannot obtain it through the machine device. As society
moves on, as new cases arise, old rules give way to new ones with multiform
refinements and the processes and the judgments of judges themselves
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are modified tremendously., A machine cannot be prospective. Moreover,
the element of human judgment, the largest and most variable element in
law administration, cannot be subjected to the control of rules to any great
degree; not nearly so much as we have always pretended it could. Law is
far less crystallized than we dare admit and it becomes fluid with variety
of case and change of judge. But assuming that law administration can be
successfully subjected to a mechanical device, there lies danger to a science
of law in such fact. It is too easy to continue the use of a device after its
adjustment with life has broken. This is not insuperable; nevertheless It
is the hardest fight the legal scientist has to make even against tho crude
legal technics of the past. Now let it be quickly said that Professor Kocou.
rek would be the first to deny that rules of law remain static, or that they
can be fixed for any long period. On the other hand, he fully recognizes the
constant process of crystallization and break up from day to day. And
his reply to my criticism would doubtless be that his creation would neces-
sarily be adjusted to these changes. But the difficulty of such a concept
is that to make the adjustments is equally as hard as to decide the case
acceptably in the first instance. Moreover, the danger that such adjust-
ments would always be made belatedly and that the real problems would
tend to become lost in the theology of the system would be just as great,
if not greater, than that afforded by the current language technics.
The appeal of a successful mechanism is tremendous. When we see the
advances in the physical world about us, .the inquisitive minded lawyer asks
why not in our science too? The medical man names every part of the body
minutely. His mastery of these gives him remarkable power. But of
course they do not furnish judgment in diagnosis. They are means pri-
marily of articulating judgment. The human body is small and static as
compared with the social body. The ponderousness of the aggregate of
jural relations if minutely named would doubtless be beyond the capacity of
the human mind and still allow it to function otherwise. And the changes
in them are so rapid that grandfather and grandson are ages apart if
measured in terms of physical life. These changes require modifications and
readjustments so that if a lawyer had to accomodate the numerous jural
relations to them he could do little else than keep up to date. The Chinese
alphabet would be a mere morning's exercise by comparison. And as I
understand Professor Kocourek's scheme of things he realizes these diffi-
culties and does not propose to name every jural relation as does the medical
man the parts of the body. On the other hana symbols-claims, duties,
privileges, etc., are to be used instead. But if symbols (words representa-
tive of several particularizations) are used, we shall lose the very advan-
tage the medical man has obtained and again face all the errors and mis-
takes which grow out of their use, and especially symbols which are quielly
loaded down with "inherent" meanings.
Nor does the logical precision of the mathematician help us any. He has
dependable premises because he constructed them so. He cannot get be,
yond them" nor does he desire to do so. But here again the lawyer cannot
control his premises. His starting point comes from the outside. But It is
said that while mathematics is an ideal thing wholly unrelated to life, yet
its value is inestimable to human society. The argument is that law may
have its pure science as well. There are suggestions in Professor
Kocourek's book which intimate that this might well be his objective. I
had rather believe that tHe device here offered is not so ambitious. But
even so, the element of multiple human judgments which would have to be
depended upon to draw down the gifts of a pure science to the troubles of
an every day world doubtless would continue to be uncontrollable and thus
unpredictable. Though I should quickly agree that if he has found the
basis of a pure science of law, -in time his contribution would render the
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profoundest service to society. My doubts here go back to the assumption
that society is stable enough for such a science or that we are yet even ap-
proaching a "maturity of law," if we shall ever do so.
As hopeless as this approach to a science of law seems to me, I do not feel
that a rather highly perfected science is beyond reach. But instead of a
science built upon absolutes as here suggested it perhaps will be one built
upon relatives; highly expansible and elastic words, guiding rules, simple
organization, all of which have the quality of accommodating themselves
instantly to the dominant factor of human judgment. Such, in fact, ceem
to be the qualities which gave the Holfeldian scheme its quich hold on legal
scholars and which have marked its further extensions. Uniformity may
well be the basis of a science of chemistry or even biology, while a science
of law may be required to rest upon the variables of each new day. Suffice
it here to say, that such a science should postulate law in its nature as
something entirely different from "an aggregate of rules" or anything
similar thereto. Moreover, a science so based would find no necessity of
putting much emphasis on a language technic. It would likely find the
language available for the time and place sufficient. Thought has always
had strange ways of making itself articulate. It is clear enough that where
words are lacking, ideas are usually wanting. (p. 363) Such a science
would doubtless go much further back than rules, or claims, duties, privi-
leges, powers, etc., for its studies. It would go back behind the barter and
bargain currency of the day.
Now all this does not mean that Professor Kocourek's book is not a most
valuable one. I have read few books which have stirred my imagination
or excited my admiration more. No one can read it and have any peace
or complacency. If it should turn out that I am all wrong and that here
are bared the foundations of a worthy science of law, then he will have
performed a remarkable service indeed. If on the other hand the magnifi-
cence of the attempt should but definitely determine that there ic no way out
through the language door, its service would be little less valuable. But
if it should be nothing more than a functionless machine for the museum,
still its wealth of parts (the highly polished and adjusted terms and dis-
tinctions) will be of real value to any science of law which may eventually
be devised, whether they be used as this author suggests or not. But
more than all of these, here is a creation of American legal ccholarhip-
a scholarship that has given its time, with a few brilliant exceptions, to
puny tasks and that in a timid way. Here is one of our most able scholars
who dares risk something; who dares play the role of a scholar. There is
nothing quite so pitiable as a leader of thought who is afraid to lead; whose
whole mind is occupied with dodges and defenses to protect him from the
chagrin of having been detected in error. On the other hand, there is no
encouragement like creation by a contemporary. From this point of view
the publisher's announcement is fully warranted.
LEo Gna:z.
The Paradoxes of Legal Science. By Benjamin N. Cardozo. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1928. pp. v, 142.
The four lectures contained in this small volume were delivered at Colum-
bia University on the Carpentier Foundation. They give us the latest con-
clusions of one of our most enlightened and intelligent judges as to the
nature of law and of the judicial process. For this reason, aside from all
others, the lbetures are of great interest and importance.
The title of the first lecture indicates the general trend of the discussion,
Rest and Motion-Stability and Progress. Law must be sttble and yet
must change to meet new economic and social conditions. How are the two
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demands to be reconciled? Judge Cardozo tells us he has consulted the
philosophers as well as the scientists, and that throughout he finds the same
antithesis.
"The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the
synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the law. 'Nomos,'
one might fairly say, is the child of antinomies, and is born of them in trav-
ail. We fancy ourselves to be dealing with some ultra-modern controversy,
the product of the clash of interests in an industrial society. The problem
is laid bare, and at its core are the ancient mysteries crying out for under-
standing-rest and motion, the one and the many, the self and the notself,
freedom and necessity, reality and appearance, the absolute and the rela-
tive. We have the claims of stability to be harmonized with those of prog-
ress. We are to reconcile liberty with equality, and both of them with
order. The property rights of the individual we are to respect, yet we are
not to press them to the point at which they threaten the welfare or the
security of the many. We must preserve to justice its universal quality, and
yet leave to it the capacity to be individual and particular. The precedent
or the statute, though harsh, is to be obeyed, yet obeyed also, at the sacri-
fice not seldom of the written word, are to be the meliorating precepts of
equity and conscience."
There is much in the present series of lectures, as there was in the earlier
ones on The Nature of the Judicial Process, which seems to suggest that it
is the learned author's belief that the "methods of judging" can be separated
into distinct categories, such as the method of logic, the method of historical
development, the method of sociology, etc., and that the result of the judg-
ing will depend upon the method used. The following passage, for example,
seems to say just that:
"The law has its formulas, and its methods of judging, appropriate to
conservation, and its methods and formulas appropriate to change. If we
figure stability and progress as opposite poles, then at one pole we have the
maxim of stare decisis and the method of decision by the tool of a deductive
logic; at the other we have the method which subordinates origins to ends.
The one emphasizes considerations of uniformity and symmetry, and follows
fundamental conceptions to ultimate conclusions. The other gives freer
play to considerations of equity and justice, and the value to soety of the
interests affected."
Just what is meant is not entirely clear to the reviewer. It seems to be
implied that by the "method of deductive logic" one can follow "fundamental
conceptions to ltimate conclusions." If the reviewer understands the re-
sults 'of modern investigations into the nature of formal or "deductive"
logic, no such procedure can be or ever actually is followed by any human
being in solving problems which involve judgment. It is quite probable that
the learned author would fully agree to this, but since what he says is
capable of'an opposite interpretation and leaves much unsaid, it has seemed
to the reviewer desirable to state the matter clearly. Obviously the limil-
tations of a book review preclude the possibility of developing the assign-
ment in detail.
This lack of clearness as to this fundamental matter leads Judge Car-
doze to overlook, in his discussion of the development of our law, the fact
that legal principles-and rules as well-are in the habit of hunting in
pairs. By this is meant that whenever we are confronted by a doubtful
situation, one which therefore demands reflective thinking, we usually find
that in the past conflicting interest and conflicting social policies have
each received recognition from the courts to some extent, and that these
results have been rationalized in terms of "conflicting" principles (or rules),
each of which can easily, and without departing from any, prior decisions,
be "construed" as "applicable" to the "new" case. Space permits of only
one concrete example. A colleague submitted to two eminent tudents of
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Anglo-American law for critical discussion the following problem: a con-
tract of employment expressly provides that claims for wages shall be non-
assignable. A court has held that a claim for wages (which without the
restriction would be assignable) is assignable in spite of the rcstriction.
Is or is not the decision correct or sound "on principle'? One of the
eminent students said in substance: the decision is incorrect, for it violates
the principle of freedom of contract. Said the other: the decision is sound;
rights arising from contract are property; the restriction is an attempt to
restrain the free alienation of property, and so ineffective. Obviously a
more realistic logic would recognize that, so far as the decisions go, neither
of the supposed "principles" ought to be stated as a "univerzal," ready
to serve as the major premise of a syllogism by which the case can be
decided. What we should say is that generally we permit freedom of con-
tract, but not always, and that generally restraints on alienation of property
are invalid, but sometimes they are not. So stated, however, the illusion
of being able to reason deductively disappears, for if all that we can say
is that most men are mortal but some are not, we shall find it quite diffi-
cult to assert categorically that Socrates is mortal. Thus deprived of our
"deductive" support, we shall find it necessary to examine into our "real"
reasons for wishing to decide the case one way or the other, and thereby be
compelled to note the social or economic consequences of a deciin one way
or the other.
One must also dissent from the assumption of the learned author that in
the field of the conflict of laws the results have actually been reached by the
"remorseless application of [deductive] logic." (p. 68) Here, as in other
branches of the law, the appearance of "logical" reasoning is preserved
by the use of terms of ambiguous and shifting meaning; and while the
actual results reached can to a considerable extent be thrown cx post facto
into a logical system-especially if one ignores a large number of the deci-
sions as "'unsound"-this is merely a more or less convenient way of stating
decisions which were in truth reached for other than so-called "logical"
reasons.
The lectures are written in Judge Cardozo's usual delightful style, and,
while they add little that is fundamental to what he had already given us,
are interesting and suggestive throughout. It is to be hoped that they vill
be widely read, not only by lawyers but also by laymen who are interested
in the legal system under which they live.
WALTER Wnnsu'1a CooK.
Johns Hopkins University
Institute for the Study of Law
Cases on Wills and AdministrationL By Mechem and Atkinson. Rochester,
Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1928. pp. iv, 698.
There are two striking features of this new casebook just brought out
by Dean Philip Mechem of the University of Kansas Law School and his
colleague, Professor Thomas E. Atkinson. Pezhaps the most noteworthy
feature is their ability to produce an excellent casebook containing but few
English cases, and to find recent cases by which they treat the problems
with which they propose to deal.
To make clear the innovation, a comparison between their book and the
two other most commonly used casebooks on Wills, the one by Profezsor
Warren and the other by Professor Costigan, is in order. Profcsor War-
ren's casebook contains 269 cases, of which 118 or somewhat fewer than
fifty per cent are English; 93 or appro.imately one-third of Profersor
Costigan's 289 cases are English. The present book contains 192 cases, of
which 24, or one-eighth, are English cases.
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To bring home the second innovation, namely the use of recent cases, it
may be said, unless the reviewer is inaccurate in his figures, that 73 cases of
the 192 were decided between 1900 and 1920. Thirteen cases were decided
in 1921, six in 1922, five in 1923, seven in 1924, eleven in 1925, eleven in
1926, seven in 1927 and one case in 1928 although the casebook is dated
March 1st, 1928. Thus, 134 of the 192 cases were decided since 1900 and
only 58 were decided earlier than that date. This seems to mean that the
historical method of approach has been abandoned, and what perhaps would
be called the "functional" approach to the study of the problem has been
followed.
The first chapter deals with The Rationale of Succession; further chap-
ters deal with Mental Capacity, with Undue Influence and Fraud, with the
Execution of Wills and with Testamentary Character and Intent. It may be
noticed that the problems involved in mistake have not been considered in
connection with undue influence and fraud, but rather in connection with
so-called dependent relative revocation. The next chapter, at least with
respect to its title, has something new-The Integration of Wills, including
so-called incorporation by reference. This is an excellent chapter, and the
selection of cases and the footnotes show an appreciation of the fact that
to treat the problems here under the heading Incorporation by Reference
gives a misleading and confused idea of the situations that arise.
Bemis v. Fletcher 1 is used, presumably, as a horrible example of so-called
incorporation by reference, the reference looking to the future. There are
two or three cases which illustrate the fact that not all the problems can
be accounted for either by the theory of integration or of incorporation by
reference: that is, they illustrate the fact that a will may contain a gen-
eral description of beneficiaries or of property, which general description
must at some later time be made more definite by another act or event. If
that act or event is testamentary in character, if it is intended to supple-
ment the will, it should be an attested or incorporated act or event.
In the section dealing with "mistake," the editors have sought to bring
the problems connected with the execution of wills into juxtaposition with
the problems met in the revocation of wills. The cases selected show ad-
mirably the confusion that has arisen in the minds of the courts in dealing
with this problem. The cases on the revalidation of wills are also well
selected. The reviewer is glad to note the case of In re Hardyman,2 which
to his mind, sets forth the sound rule regarding the significance of repub-
lication.
It is interesting to note how the subject matter varies as between this
casebook and the two older ones. A number of topics in the older books
have either been omitted or reduced to footnotes: for example, the problems
of accounting, of priorities, of time of payment of legacies and distributive
shares, of refunding, all of which are important considerations in the older
books. There are two cases which remotely, but not directly, deal with
inheritance taxation. (pp. 393, 489)
On the other hand, many items are dealt with which are practically ig-
mnored in the older books: for example, family settlements (p. 384) ; agree-
ments not to probate (p. 388) ; provisions in the will for forfeiture of in-
terest in the event of contest (p. 404) ; agreements not to contest wills (p.
397) ; the interest necessary to entitle one to contest (p. 447) ; the distinc-
tion between adverse claims and claims against the estate (p. 483) ; legal
services performed by the executor (p. 522) ; payment of interest by the
executor and forfeiture of commissions (p. 530); the effect of the Statute
of Non-claim on the filing of claims against an executor for misappropria-
tion of trust funds; the filing of claims secured and unsecured (pp. 562,
'575); the manner of adjudication of claims (p. 566); the garnishment or
attachment of the interest of a legatee or distributee (p. 590) ; the signifl-
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cance of per capita as distinguished from per stirpes distribution (p. 595);
the peculiai rule regarding ancestral estates under the California com-
munity system (p. 602); the effect of the conduct of heirs on succession
(p. 615) ; ademption by the committee of an insane person (p. 665), and so
on. A case which the reviewer regards as a horrible illustration of what
should not happen when there is a lapse of residuary legacies, is given at
page 684.3
In addition to these items, the problem of the finality of probate decrie
is brought out under two subdivisions: (a) as bearing upon adverse claim3
(p. 483); (b) as bearing upon claims under a will or under a decree of
distribution. (p. 690) Under the heading Anticipation of Inheritance, the
editors have included cases involving conveyances and releases by the hdr
or distributee, the satisfaction of legacies and deviser, and advancemcnto.
(p. 629) They have raised the issue whether the assignment of a life in-
surance policy to a child is an advancement. (p. 645)
It is interesting to note that the editors have devoted 85 pages to the
functions and necessity for probate, whereas Costigan devoted 14 pages and
Warren 3 pages to the same topic. There is also a greater variety of prob-
lems raised respecting the jurisdiction of probate courts.
The book contains many notes which exhibit much research and study
of the problems discussed. Many of the notes also contain variations of
the problems stated in the principal case and invite inquiry as to the proper
solution of them. There are forms given for proceedings in probate matt:rz,
and the references to law review articles and to discussions in the various
sets of annotated reports are rather full.
This casebook therefore presents a wide departure from the traditional
one on this subject. Some may not approve of the complete omiszion of
many topics which are treated in the other casebooks; but who is willing
to assert that the topics inserted are not important, and in fact indispcnzible
for a thoroughgoing knowledge of probate law? This reviewer feels some
hesitation with respect to at least three cases, those on pages 53, 139, and
527. The doubt arises not from the feeling that the problems are not im-
portant, but rather from a feeling that perhaps they can be more thoroughly
examined in a course in Trusts.
The reviewer believes that an excellent bit of work has been done by these
editors, and that the casebook is well worthy of a trial in class room worh.
ALvni E. Evis.
1251 Mass. 178, 146 N. E. 277 (1925).
[19251 1 Ch. 287.
3 Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. S19 (1922).
Banks and Banking. By John T. Morse, Jr. Sixth Edition. Revised and
enlarged by Harvey C. Voorhees. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1928.
VoL I, pp. d, 952. Vol. II, pp. viii, 953-2134.
The standing of this work within its field is well attested by the fact
that it has gone through six editions, two within the last ten years., Morse
continues, no doubt, to be the outstanding work of its kind. It carries with
it a reputation acquired through its use by courts and profession for almost
fifty years. A decision upon some question of banking law would scarcely
appear complete if Morse were not quoted or cited.
Five editions of a treatise of this character may be expected to have so
definitely settled its scope and plan that a sixth would reveal only slight
changes in the structure of the work. A survey of the table of contents
justifies this expectation. Chapter and section headings remain the same
as in previous editions. In broad outline, the two-volume work may be
said to treat: 1. Organization, Powers and Management of Ban x-_; 2.
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Deposits, Checks, Collections and Liens; 3. Insolvency, Forfeiture, Ultra
Vires and Liabilities of Shareholders; 4. Bank Bills. To the subject-matter
of the fifth edition have been added appendices containing the text of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, acts of Congress affecting the Federal Re-
serve System, and an explanatory table of changes in the national banking
laws resulting from the passage of the McFadden Bill (Act of Feb. 25,
1927).
Since the publication of the fifth editicn much banking law has been
made. The Banks and Banking occupies 367 pages in West's third decen-
nial digest (Bills and Notes, 423 pages for the same period). One may
readily appreciate the task of an editor who endeavors to expound the re-
sults of those years and to chart the trends and developments of this branch
of the law within the compass of footnotes, with only minor variations of
text. The present editor has brought the citations up to date and has fre-
quently digested important cases, decided since the last edition, in the ac-
companying footnotes. In view of the increasing volume of litigation, the
development of new banking fields and the changing viewpoints of courts on
many banking subjects (e. g., judicial notice of bank collection methods,
ownership of deposited items, etc.), it is to be regretted that the publishers
and the editor felt it necessary to confine themselves within the framework
of earlier editions.
No doubt any author writing within this field will always be confronted
with the problem stated at the opening of the work: that is, finding the
median between treating only such part of the law as owes its existence
to banks and banking, and including all law applicable to banks. As the
latter is impossible without writing an encyclopedia, and the former is
cobviously inadequate, "the sensible plan seems to be, to group in these
-volumes the law peculiar to banks, and such further matter as is of frc-
quent application in, or has a very important bearing upon, their business,"
Plainly, the latter objective cannot be fully attained unless note is taken
of changing banking technique and the litigation or legislation attendant
thereon; nor can it be reached by attempting to confine a treatment of such
subjects to inelastic categories. If limitations of space prevent expansion,
the selective process must become more critical.
The importance of the Federal Reserve System in financial affairs would
seem to justify an independent treatment of the law relating thereto, rather
than limiting such treatment to the scattering of pertinent citations in an
isolated fashion through the footnotes. As noted, one appendix contains
the text of the Federal Reserve Act; another contains other acts of Congress
affecting the system. But since the passage of the Act in 1913, there has
arisen a considerable body of case law, which together with the regulations
of the Federal Reserve Board, sets the scene for a large part of the opera-
tions of the system. No digest of such regulations is listed, nor, for that
matter, is mention of any regulation to be found in the index.
Almost two hundred American cases involving letters of credit have been
adjudicated; the use of such instruments is of growing importance, es-
pecially in import and export transactions; the text however devotes but
two pages t the subject. Trust receipts and trade acceptances are not
indexed. The only reference to bankers' acceptances directs one to the
text of the Federal Reserve Act; the same is true of the fiduciary powers
of national banks. Guaranty fund cases are digested in a six-page footnote
under Who May Be A Banker. The problems arising from branch bank-
ing are relegated to the footnotes of Business of the Bank-Timo and
Place. Obviously, the text of the work as a whole is not inaterially varied
or added to.
Some dead timber may be expected to be carried over from edition to
,edition when a work is re-edited and not revised. Until Congress sees fit
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to remove the tax on state bank notes, the consideration accorded them
by the treatise could well be eliminated without loss. Officers of savings
banks will be surprised to know that "money deposited in a savings banl:
remains the property of the depositor." The limited discussion of the
characteristics of savings banks fails to take account of the fact that today
there are, in some jurisdictions, banks with capital stock, which are as
truly savings banks as are the mutual savings institutions so well lmown
to New Englanders. A ten-page treatment of the Conflict of Laws ap-
pears as in prior editions and of course cannot be other than confusing
owing to its inadequacy.
A 250-page digest of all cases construing the national banking laws con-
stitutes a valuable feature of the work and one of particular interest to all
those connected with national banks. The much-litigated matter of state
taxation of national banks comes in for thorough treatment and the cita-
tions afford immediate reference to all the holdings on the subject.
The sections devoted to bank collections have been well edited and give
the reader a thorough exposition of the various situations in which the
many vexing questions relating to collections arise. The chapter on Title
to a Deposit raises similar problems, closely related to collection matters,
and develops the question of ownership of paper deposited with a banh, but
in this connection distinctions between varying fact situations are *not
sufficiently appreciated.
It is only natural that those portions of the treatise devoted to bank
operations should seem to be more alive and of more commercial signifi-
cance than those devoted to the form and organization of a bank. With-
out belittling the importance of the latter, it seems that much would be
gained by shifting the emphasis to the former, with corresponding change3
in the space devoted to the two divisions of the subject. One ventures to
suggest that the bank in operation is of more importance (and of inter-
est) than the bank in process of formation. Perhaps the ideal treatise
would be one which would take its color from the daily work of a bank
and which would be written, primarily, from the standpoint of the varied
services and offices of a bank---extension of credit, receipt and transfer of
funds, inter-bank relations, etc., with their attendant methods and de-
vices,-rather than one which takes standardized categories as proper
subjects for distinct treatment without correlation. In the absence, and
probably until the production, of such a work, lore retains its pre-eminent
position as a treatise on the subject of banking law.
WAYNE L. Towussrm.
C17arles Dickens as a Legal Historian. By William Searle Holdsworth. New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1928. pp. 157.
Professor Holdsworth's lectures should be a joy to the student of legal
history. From them he will receive assurance that when he reads his
Dickens, he will find the description of lawyers, courts and legal proceed-
ings accurate and helpful in clothing the dry bones of legal history with
flesh and blood.
The confirmed lover of Dickens will be interested to re-read many of
his favorite passages in the light of the information Professor Holdsworth
gives, as to their accuracy and their implications. Some of Dickens' refer-
ences will be made more understandable, and the reader of Dickens will not
only enjoy this book in the first instance, but again and again will refer
to these lectures as explanatory notes to be consulted as t9 any doubtful
point connected with such descriptions as those of the Chancery Courts,
Sergeant Buzfuz, Mr. Guppy, and Mr. Jaggers.
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It is interesting to note the impression these lectures made on one reader.
Mr. A. Edward Newton, in the October Yale Review, says that he would
like to meet Professor Holdsworth and ask him, "How much longer will
you lawyers continue to regard your profession as respectable?" He states
that he intends to buy a number of copies of the book, and "send them to
my legal friends, for in spite of my dislike for their profession, every other
man I know is a lawyer. Its reading confirms in me my belief that the
law is not a science but a craft: That was also Dickens' opinion." In
another place, Mr. Newton asks, "Is there a lawyer in the pages of Dickens
who is honest or respectable?"
These impressions seem a bit curious. It is true that Dickens portraya
lawyers who are rascals, and others a bit more respectable, who are still
guilty of moral obliquities. But by the same process, it would be demon-
strated that Dickens regarded the clergy, as a whole, as very undesirable
citizens. Mr. Chadband and Mr. Stiggins are certainly as objectionable as
Dodson and Fogg. True there is a Frank Milvey but there are also Tom-
mie Traddles and Mortimer Lightwood. There is no suggestion in David
Copperfield that Traddles' ethical standings were not of the highest, and
while Dickens poked fun at Mortimer Lightwood, again it is evident that
he was an honest, as well as an attractive, man.
D~ickens described the weaknesses and shortcomings of the legal profes-
sion, as he described the weaknesses and shortcomings of many other oc-
cupations. For example, Bradley Headstone and Mr. Creakle surely are
not ideal gchoolmasters. But treating matters in this way seems a far
cry from condemnation of every occupation described, and it seems prob-
able that Professor Holdsworth will be astonished to find his book taken,
even in jest, as a demonstration that the profession of the law is subject
to the following criticism:
"Time was when most young men of nimble wits went either into the law
or the church: they were called the learned professions. This is only
another way of saying that a man after having his wits sharpened was
given license to prey on the community-of science and of business in the
modern sense, there was nothing. It is curious that it is not considered,
in England, respectable to earn money; but it is respectable to inherit It,
especially in very large amounts-if it has been stolen in the first place or
is acquired by the practice of the law, one may become very distinguished
indeed."
HARRISON HDIVITT.
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